. According to Saad (2010) , the board of directors is con sidered to be one of the two major Submitted January 2014 , accepted March 2014 components of corporate governance which provides an efficient regulatory and controlling mechanism to de crease agency problems. In addition, Ruigrok et al. (2006) point out that boards play an important role with respect to activities such as designing and implementing strategy and foster ing links between a firm and its ex ternal environment.
At the end of 2006, Saudi Arabia issued its own corporate governance code which identified the principles and best practices of good governance and described optimal corporate gov ernance structures and internal pro cesses. This was revised in 2009 and included duties and responsibilities of boards of directors in order to influ ence firm performance, for example, reviewing and adopting a strategic plan, and adequacy and integrity of the company's internal control sys tems. Nevertheless, no study has been conducted to evaluate the impact of these regulations on firm perfor mance.
The main aim of this study is to examine, in some detail, the impact of board structure on Saudi listed com panies' financial performance. Speci fically, the present paper studies the determining factors of firm perfor mance and provides additional evi dence on the influence of the characteristics of boards of directors, 92 namely board size, board composition and role of duality on firm perfor mance in the Saudi context where ownership structure is relatively un ique.
In addition, this study predicts that the prevalence of family control in Saudi Arabia is likely to moderate the effectiveness of boards of direc tors.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The following section pro vides a detailed discussion concerning the literature review and hypothesis development. Following is a discus sion on the research methodology. Next, the results of the study are reported. The final section concludes the paper.
T heoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development
Agency Theory "The hallmark of the organiza tional structure and form of modern corporations is the separation of own ership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . This kind of separation results in the so-called agency relationship which is defined, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , as a contract under which two different parties (principal and agent) engage in a contractual relationship where the principal as-signs certain tasks and decision-mak ing authority to the agent to be per formed on their behalf. This form of separation and agency relationship give rise to basic agency problems. Agency problems occur whenever the agent and principal have different objectives and divergent interests, and the principal does not know whether the manager acts and reports in the interest of their goals or whether they have incentives to maximize their own self-interests at the expense of shareholders. In other words, the pre ferences of managers are not aligned with the interests of shareholders who are unable to monitor managers per fectly (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
With this in mind, the system of corporate governance is designed for the effective and efficient operation of corporations on behalf of stake holders. Corporate governance is de scribed as "the set of mechanisms that influence the decisions made by man agers when there is a separation of ownership and control" (Larcker et al., 2007) . One of those monitoring mechanisms is the board of directors. At the most basic level, the board of directors is responsible for ensuring that top management's actions are consistent with the interests of share holders (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . According to Mallette and Fowler (1992) , boards are the agents of share holders and exist to monitor manage ment perform ance and protect shareholders' interests. Therefore, boards narrow the information gap between shareholders and manage ment, and make important decisions such as mergers and acquisitions, ca pital allotments, and corporate stra tegies (Petra, 2005) . Therefore, the monitoring functions of boards of directors were reviewed and research hypotheses were developed and are explained below.
Board Size and Financial Per formance
"Based on the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, all listed firms must have no less than three directors and no more than eleven. This sug gests, in line with the assumption of agency theory, that a firm should maintain a board size of less than eleven members in order to achieve better performance. The problems as sociated with large boards are argued to be related to communication and coordination leading to dysfunctional norms of behavior in board members (Cheng, 2008; John and Sabnet, 1998) , and to longer time being taken to make decisions and reach consensus on important decisions (Goodstein et al., 1994) . In addition, there is a higher incidence of agency problems asso ciated with larger boards than smaller ones. On the other hand, the argument of resource dependence theory as sumes that better performance asso ciated with larger boards enhances decision making due to the wider range of expertise and skills (Coleman and Biekpe, 2007) .
Empirical studies have demon strated the association between board size and company performance. For instance, Coles et al. (2008) find a positive association between larger board size and financial performance. De Andres et al. (2005) report a negative association between firm per formance and board size. Similarly, Shukeri et al. (2012) find a negative association between company perfor mance and board size. Finally, Dulewicz and H erbert (2004) find no association between board size and performance proxies. The above dis cussion shows that there have been mixed results with respect to the asso ciation between board size and com pany performance. However, this study examines this relationship from the agency theory perspective stating the following hypothesis:"
There is a significant positive rela tionship between a firm 's financial performance and board size.
Board Composition and Finan cial Performance
"The Saudi Corporate Govern ance Code suggests that not less than
one third of the members of a board must be independent members. More over, it suggests that the majority of the directors should be non-executive members. In addition, agency theory assumes that the greater the mix of inside and outside directors sitting on the board, the more effective the board will be and the better the performance will be. This is due to the experience, expertise, competitiveness, and repu tation that can be brought to the board by outside directors (Baysinger and Hoskinsson, 1990 and Fama, 1980) . Prior studies that have examined this issue obtained mixed results. Fefort and Urzua (2008), Coleman and Biekpe (2007) and Krivogorsky (2006) find that outside directors are impor tant mechanisms in the control of agency problems and in affecting firm performance positively. In contrast, others find a negative relationship between outside directors and firm performance (Shukeri et al., 2012; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Abdullah, 2006 and Klein et al., 2005) . Other researchers (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Kula, 2005; Peng et al., 2003; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Weir et al., 2002; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991) show no evidence of a significant relationship with performance. Due to the inconclusive results documen ted in prior research, the hypothesis is stated below in the form of a positive relationship as the agency theory sug gests that the presence of non-execu tive directors and independent directors on the board leads to better monitoring of management and hence improving the performance."
H2: There is a positive association between board independence and a firm ' s performance.
Role Duality and Financial Per formance
"Agency theory assumes that role duality has a negative relationship with firm performance. This is because role duality reduces the ability of directors to monitor the CEO which increases the agency problems that affect the performance negatively (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002 
Family Control, Firm Perfor mance and Board Effectiveness
"An additional test to be con ducted in an environment controlled by family ownership, such as Saudi Arabia, is to evaluate the impact of family control on the association be tween firm performance and board effectiveness. For this purpose, we divided the sample into two groups: one family controlled and the other non-family controlled.
In addition, this study predicts that the prevalence of family control in Saudi Arabia is likely to moderate the effectiveness of boards of direc tors. There are three arguments to support this. First, when managerial ownership is high, the monitoring role of corporate boards decreases (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Second, familycontrolled firms are less likely to select independent external directors in or der to keep the family business within the family, thus weakening the mon itoring effectiveness of the board of directors. Third, director indepen-dence is likely to be compromised when a family member sits on the board of a company because the fa mily member will have control over the appointment, contract extension, compensation and recommendation of the independent directors, thus independent directors are less likely to contradict the family member's interests." Table 1 indicates that the initial sample for this study is all Saudi listed companies, which are required to comply with corporate governance mechanisms recommended by Capital Market Authority CMA. This study focuses on the non-financial listed companies on the Saudi Arabia stock exchange. Firms in the financial sector were excluded from the sample since the finance industry is a highly-regu lated industry and the accounting standards in use in this sector are different from those of other sectors. All corporate governance data were obtained from the company's annual report.
The dependent variable of this study is firm financial performance. To measure this variable, the study uses Return On Assets (ROA). Ac cording to Klapper and Love (2004) , ROA is one of the best performance measures used to address the relation ship with corporate governance. Therefore, the study uses ROA to determine the relationship of this mea- 
Missing corporate governance data (12) Table 2 Summarises explanatory variables, providing brief definitions and indicating predicted association.
Explanatory Variables

Control Variables
Previous studies have indicated that certain other factors can influence a firm's performance. Therefore, the following control variables include firm characteristics: (1) firm size, (2) leverage, (3) audit quality and (4) family ownership. Table 3 provides an overview of the control variables 
Model Specifications
This study uses the following panel d a ta fixed-effects o rdinary least square (OLS) regression analysis to test the association between the de pendent variable of firm performance and the independent variables of cor porate governance, as given in Equa tion 1.
( 1)
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Results
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
The descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 4 . The minimum value of the dependent variable (financial performance) was from -13.7% to a maximum of 29.9% with a mean of 7%, which implies that each Saudi riyal invested in the assets of the sampled firm generates 7 halalat of return.
The board size ranges from a mini mum of four and to a maximum of twelve with a mean of 8.2. This is in line with the findings of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who find that efficient and effective boards have an average of between eight and ten members. Moreover, the results are consistent with the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (2006), which states that listed firms must have no less than three directors and no more than eleven.
With respect to board composi tion, the results indicate that more than half (65%) of Saudi listed firms' board members are independent di rectors. This is also in line with the guidelines of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (2006), which pro- poses that independent board direc tors must make up no less than onethird of the members. This is also consistent with the findings of Rashidah and Al-Janadi (2006), who find that the boards of Saudi firms are dominated by independent members.
Regarding role duality, the Table shows that the average is 76.6%, which indicates that the majority of sampled firms have separated the roles of chair man and CEO. However, the recom m en d atio n o f Saudi C o rp o ra te Governance Code 2006 is to have this separation for all listed companies. About 25% of listed firms do not comply with this recommendation, yet.
To investigate multicollinearity among independent variables, Table  5 presents the results of Pearson cor relation matrix among all the inde pendent variables. A critical value that represents the high correlation be tween two variables is between -0.70 and 0.70. If it is less than that, the multicollinearity between variables does not exist (Gujarati, 2003) ). The results show that the highest level of correlation is 0.51, which is between LEVRG variable and SIZE variables. It is followed by the significant corre lation between SIZE variable and BIG4 variable with a value of 0.38. However, all these correlations are still below 0.7, which implies that there would be no serious problems among regressed variables, and hence it would not affect the validity of the results. Table 6 reports the OLS regression results of the dependent variable and all the independent variables of board structure and the control variables which suggest 17% of the variation in the dependent variable of sampled firms is explained by the quality of the independent variables of board struc ture. The adjusted R-squared is com parable to other studies of the same nature such as Krivogorsky (2006) and Ehikioya (2009) .
Multivariate Analysis Results and Discussions
In terms of the first hypothesis, this study finds that board size (BRDSIZE) is insignificantly associated with firm performance. The results indicate that larger boards are ineffective in enhan cing financial performance. The lack of association between large boards and financial performance is similar to the findings of Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) , who point out that boards of directors' size do not affect a firm's financial performance.
Consistent with the second hy pothesis, the results indicate that there is a positive and significant relation ship (coefficient = 0.024 and p< .05) b e tw e e n board independence (BRDIND) and the indicator of firm perform ance, suggesting that the more independent the board is, the better a firm's performance. This find ing is in line with agency theory which suggests that the presence of non executive directors and independent directors on the board leads to better monitoring of management and hence
improving performance. In addition, Krivogorsky (2006) finds a strong relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the board and performance.
In the Saudi context, this finding contradicts the conjecture that Saudi firms may apply corporate govern ance mechanisms in order to adhere to CMA regulations rather than for governance purposes; time may have played a part in amending this con jecture. This shows the importance of board independence in enhancing the performance of Saudi listed firms, especially after the newly-enacted Corporate Governance Regulations, thus supporting supporting CMA ef forts to regulate the Saudi capital market in order to protect share holders' rights through corporate gov ernance regulations.
With respect to the third hypoth esis which states that there is a sig nificant negative relationship between a firm's financial performance and role duality, the findings reveal nega tive and significant association be tween the two variables measured by ROA. This is in line with Ehikioya (2009) , who reports a negative rela tionship between role duality and performance, and could support the notion that corporate governance may contribute to the monitoring role of the board but, on the other hand, In order to evaluate the impact of family control on the association be tween firm performance and board effectiveness, we have divided the sample into two groups: the first fa mily controlled and the second non family controlled. Table 7 shows that boards of di rectors are less effective in firms with family control. On the other hand, the results show that the board indepen dence coefficient is significantly posi tive, and d u a lity is n eg atively associated with firm performance for regression tests in the non-family con trolled firms only.
These results indicate that family control in Saudi firms moderates the association between corporate gov ernance (boards of directors) and firm performance. Therefore, this finding may suggest that family controlled firms provide a closer monitored en vironment which may function as a monitoring substitute for corporate governance. Moreover, this questions the validity of applying the corporate governance model which was initially designed for widespread ownership firms rather than family-controlled firms. Board size has no effect in both groups. This suggests that an increase in the number of independent direc tors is unlikely to have an impact on firm performance regardless of firm ownership structure.
Conclusion
"This paper has examined the rela tionship between boards of directors' effectiveness and firm performance in Saudi listed firms. Additionally, it has examined whether family control influ ences the relationship between boards of directors' effectiveness and firm per formance. Overall, the findings provide evidence that independent board mem bers and the separation of the positions of CEO and Chairman are positively 102 associated with firm performance. However, the effectiveness of the board of directors is weaker in family con trolled firms.
Like most research of this nature, this paper is subject to a number of lim ita tio n s. M ost im p o rta n tly , although we used a well-known proxy for family control, the validity of the findings is still subject to accurate estimation of family control of the firm. Endogeneity is also a common limitation of this type of research.
Despite their inherent limitations, the findings provide valuable insights to regulators such as the CMA for developing appropriate regulations on the corporate governance system of Saudi listed firms, especially the appointment and the authority of in dependent non-executive directors on family controlled firms' boards. Countries with an institutional envir onment similar to that of Saudi Ara bia, such as Gulf Council countries, may benefit from these findings. In vestors' awareness may be raised by Copyright of Arab Journal of Administrative Sciences is the property of Kuwait University, Academic Publication Council and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
